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mandate," and an abuse of discretion. Therefore, the court held the trial
court had the discretion whether or not to require MLI to return the water
flow onto the Goodes' property to pre-development levels.
Second, the Goodes contended the trial court erred in finding that no
further reasonable remedies existed to limit the flow of water from MLI's
property to the Goodes' property beyond the limit attained by the detention
pond. Furthermore, the Goodes argued the trial court erred by ordering
the ditch to be constructed on their property rather than MLI's property.
The court stated that the trial court has broad discretion in fashioning
equitable remedies based on the exigencies of the case. Moreover, the
court would not disturb an injunction fashioned by the trial court unless it
found a manifest abuse of discretion. In reviewing the record, the court
could not conclude that requiring the parties to share the cost of
constructing a drainage ditch across the Goodes' property constituted an
abuse of discretion.
The dissent argued the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to
fashion a remedy which addressed abatement of the nuisance, and by
compelling the affected party to bear responsibility to clean up a nuisance it
did not create. Furthermore, the dissent argued the majority overlooked
expert testimony that presented evidence of further reasonable steps
available for decreasing the water flow from MLI's property.
Ryan 0. Remners

Rouse v. Georgia Dep't of Natural Resources, No. S99A1148, 1999 WL
1048241 (Ga. Nov. 22, 1999) (holding that the Protection of Tidewaters
Act was not unconstitutional for vagueness of terms and neither infringed
on fundamental rights nor violated equal protection).
The Protection of Tidewaters Act ("Act"), passed in 1992, included
provisions that allowed the Department of Natural Resources
("Department") to order the removal of any "structure" that was located in
the "tidewaters" of the State. A grandfather provision allowed some
structures predating the Act to remain for a maximum of five years. Rouse
owned a houseboat and a river house on the tidal portion of the Altamaha
River. The houseboat consisted of a styrofoam bottomed, six-sided wood
frame bolted on top with a roof tied to a tree with four lines. The river
house was on stilts and was embedded in the river bottom with concrete
cylinders. The Department permitted Rouse's houseboat to remain until
1997, but denied a permit for the riverboat due to "sanitation and safety"
concerns.
Rouse argued the Act was unconstitutional on a variety of grounds.
The court addressed three central arguments: (1) the vagueness of the
terms "structure" and "tidewaters;" (2) the denial of equal protection; and
(3) an unconstitutional taking.
In addressing the first issue, the court noted that a statute would violate
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due process when it was so vague that those of common intelligence must
guess at the meaning and differ in its application. The Act defined
"structure," in part, as something constructed or built that was "capable of
being used as a place of habitation ... not being used [or] not capable of
being used as a means of transportation." The court declined to find the
term "structure" as unconstitutionally vague merely because it failed, as
Rouse argued, to define "means of transportation." In addressing the term
"tidewaters," the court determined that the statute "plainly" indicated all
public waters within the territory of the State of Georgia.
Rouse also contended the Act violated equal protection because it
granted exceptions to commercial establishments. The court first noted
that the Act did not affect a fundamental right of Rouse. As such, there
needed only be a "reasonable relationship" between the legislative
classification and the state purpose.
The court determined it was
reasonable for the legislature to exempt certain commercial establishments
from the Act because those establishments benefited the public's use of the
tidewaters of the State.
Rouse's final contention alleged the Act equated a taking of his
property. The court stated that Rouse did not have any entitlement to
maintain his property in the tidewaters since he did not have permits to be
there before the passage of the Act. Further, Rouse did not fall into any
exception within the Act, and therefore was entitled to no protection from
the enforcement of the Act.
Kim Shropshire
IDAHO
United States v. City of Challis, 988 P.2d 1199 (Idaho 1999) (holding
that the Multi-Use Sustained-Yield Act did not provide the basis for federal
reserved rights for national forests).
The United States ("U.S.") brought an action for general adjudication
of water rights concerning thirty-seven water right claims located in
Idaho's Snake River basin. The U.S. originally filed these water right
claims under the Multi-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 ("MUSYA") in
1993, claiming a priority date of June 12, 1960 (the date of MUSYA's
enactment) under MUSYA and Idaho water appropriation law. The U.S.
claimed that the MUSYA provided the basis for non-consumptive instream
flows to allow for water to remain in streams and lakes for the purpose of
protecting recreational values, fish, and wildlife. Such water rights could
potentially curtail upstream water rights, but would allow downstream
users to divert water.
The State of Idaho ("State") filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that MUSYA did not establish a basis for implied federal reserved
water rights. The U.S. also filed a motion for summary judgment asserting
that no material facts were in dispute as to legitimate federal reserved

